THE NEW CYCLE IN LATIN AMERICA

RAIMON OBIOLS

The year 2006 saw intense political and electoral activity in Latin America. The latest results confirm the existence of a general trend: a combination of political developments that do not lend themselves to easy simplification but mark a clear swing to the left. The panorama of events is impressive:

Venezuela (Chávez 1999 and 2006) / Chile (Lagos 2000 / Bachelet 2006) / Brazil (Lula 2003 and 2006) / Argentina (Kirchner 2003) / Panama (Torrijos 2004) / Uruguay (Tabaré Vázquez 2005) / Bolivia (Morales 2005) / Costa Rica (Arias 2006) / Nicaragua (Ortega 2006) / Peru (Alan García 2006) / Ecuador (Correa 2006).

It is particularly significant when we bear in mind that, in the past, leftwing experiments in Latin America, from Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala en 1954 to Salvador Allende, have been scarce, brief and dramatic.

While we cannot speak of a unified trend (the panorama is not homogeneous, to say the least), we are clearly seeing some general developments rather than a collection of isolated cases:

1) The majority of the electorate in the region voted against the existing high level of social inequality[1] and expressed dissatisfaction with the Washington Consensus reforms. There has been a turn towards governments of the centre-left and left.

2) These are democratic processes. In the mid-1970s, only Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela had democratic regimes. Today, all the countries of Latin America, except Cuba, are formally democracies and hold multi-party elections. Although it would be inaccurate to speak of general stability, there is little likelihood of a military coup. The risks are of another order and have a great deal to do with the actual results of action by the new governments in the economic and social spheres.

These results interest us not only for reasons of solidarity: they affect us too. In this respect, the following factors are particularly important:

1) Despite a world context that seems to be confirming the self-fulfilling prophecy of the ‘clash of civilisations’, current political developments in Latin America are not dominated by religious or ‘civilisational’ concerns, or indeed ethnic and national issues. The main concerns are the challenges of dealing with social inequality and making democratic instruments and institutions work – and those issues are central to our own political outlook.

2) The ‘reforms’ concept (to some extent hijacked by the right in recent years) is changing sides: a common trend is the emergence of the view that the Washington Consensus has nothing more to offer and that new policies are needed. However, ‘new’ no longer means the neoliberal paradigm but the search for new models. This trend demands a response from us in particular.

3) Although there are disparities and contradictions between them, all the governments in question are in favour of regional integration. Of course, the assertion of national sovereignty and the role of the state are enormously important factors in all the processes we are discussing, but they combine – often conflictually – with a general trend towards regional integration that is a response to the challenge of rapid globalisation. The ‘nationalist/sovereignist’ and ‘transnational/integrationist’ impulses jointly determine (though not without contradictions and confrontations) the heartbeat of the whole of Latin America – in a process comparable to the contraction and decontraction of the heart itself – and are likely to do so for years to come.

            4) The new cycle in Latin American politics is taking place in a world of great changes, notably those affecting the presence and influence of the various international players in the region[2].

Updating our European approach

            We can play a positive role in Latin America, and we should give it more attention and increase our political will for dialogue and collaboration with our interlocutors in the region. But to do so we need a new, updated analysis.

We must do away, once and for all, with some traditional features of our approach. In recent decades our agenda was relatively simple (and helped to achieve positive results): fighting military dictatorships, helping the victims of persecution and exiles, promoting dialogue between parties in armed conflicts, developing peace processes, defending human rights, engaging in ‘development aid’ and humanitarian activities. We do not have to change any of these fundamentals. But what we need now is to renew our vision of Latin America and our agenda for the region, in view of a new situation that is more complicated and in many respects unprecedented. 

The change in analysis and political approach involves, first and foremost, a change of attitude. In particular, we must understand that our interlocutors want to be treated as genuine interlocutors, not recipients of assistance or aid. Paternalism is stupid and eurocentrism out of order.

Secondly, we must realise that approaches based exclusively on ‘aid and development’ agendas are also out of place. To say the EU is the main donor in the region ignores the crucial fact that our interlocutors are pursuing international strategies aimed at achieving greater influence in multilateral institutions and, as a priority, a change in the commercial policies of the US and the EU.[3]

We must also avoid simplifications and generalisations. We should always bear in mind that the term ‘Latin America and the Caribbean’ covers countries and sub-regions with enormous differences. From that starting point, we must try to identify and comprehend both the differences and the common features..

Many observers (Castañeda, Rice, Oppenheimer, The Economist, etc.) see the present cycle in Latin American politics as a ‘two lefts’ scenario: on the one hand the radical populists, in the time-honoured tradition of the strident leader; on the other, the social democrats and the centre-left governments. This dichotomy has the virtue of simplicity and, for some, convenience. It allows both the right and the traditional left to distinguish between the ‘bad guys’ and the ‘good guys’. But we are faced with a much more complex and changing reality.[4]

In each country, the slogans of the governmental majority reflect the social and political conditions that made its victory possible, the country’s cultural and political traditions, the relative strength of its institutions, and the influence of factors such as natural resources, external pressures and position in the global market. Each case is different, and the only rule that can be deduced is that populist tendencies emerge when the party system has collapsed, and not when the rule of law is more solidly established and the party system more stable. But this rule must be tempered by the influence of specific factors (especially the emergence of indigenous movements in certain countries), the variable impact of new social movements, and the evolving nature of each national situation.

            The most important thing is to understand the common challenges facing all Latin American countries. In a context of major structural, national and political differences, a common element stands out that is the crucial challenge for all those countries: the enormous longstanding and persisting inequality, aggravated by the ‘social debt’ generated in the period 1980-2000.

The main problem facing governments is to break out of the vicious circle of ‘inequality – low growth – poverty’. The new political cycle in Latin America will have a positive outcome – which at present is by no means certain – only if the change in the political trend is accompanied by a change in the trend of socio-economic development. I say ‘a change in the trend’ because people are patient if they can see that next year will not be as bad as last year, that the trend will continue, and that children will have a better life than their parents. A few years ago, Edmundo Jarquín said the region’s worst affliction was its ‘hope deficit’. Moises Naïm recently evoked the risk of a ‘patience deficit’ in Latin America. These are the rocks between which Latin America’s new left and centre-left governments have to steer a course.

These challenges are a good yardstick for measuring the success of government policy and – increasingly – political methods and instruments. Just as they are in Europe.

With the exception of Concertación in Chile, Latin America’s left and centre-left governments are newcomers to the field of practical policy-making. For the time being, despite abundant comments about emerging populism in the region, there are no signs of populist action by governments (the situation in Venezuela is highly specific). In general, the trend is towards cautious taxation, greater state intervention in economic affairs, and the search for growth, job creation (especially in export sectors) and stability.[5] These governments are looking for new economic policy and development models, and it is too early to make any predictions.[6]

The main risk is the emergence of a gap between the expectations raised by the recent election of left and centre-left governments and what those governments are actually able to deliver in terms of economic and social development. If results are not forthcoming, if no change for the better can be perceived, then the ‘hope deficit’ may give way to a ‘patience deficit’, with possible unrest and reactions. That is the worst-case scenario not only for the peoples of the region but also for new progressive forces throughout the world, including Europe.

Creating a new ‘partnership’ between European and Latin American socialism

            In speaking of socialism, I shall not waste time in attempting to classify governments, parties and movements, or in ideological hair-splitting. In the Latin American reality of today, there are two basic developments that I consider significant in terms of socialism:

1) The underlying processes in the new political cycle in Latin America are movements in public opinion and action reflecting a demand for greater equality in a democratic framework, i.e. ‘more socialism’;

2) The agendas inevitably facing the new Latin American governments, in their present national, regional and global context, are ones that we see as ‘social democratic’, although some of those governments are unable or unwilling to recognise this (an attitude which we must understand and respect). We must not pay too much attention to labels.

To a considerable extent (and despite all the differences between the situations in Europe and Latin America), we can identify common challenges that impose the duty to think and, as far as possible, act together.

The fact is that we all have a great debate in store for us, in this first decade of the new century, on new policies regarding wealth creation and distribution, the political and social organisation of democracy, national identity and regional integration, social cohesion, joint policies on the interdependencies and problems created by galloping globalisation, new models of justice and security, and of humane sustainable development.

Given the considerable cultural (and hence political) affinities between Europe and Latin America, our task is to engage in a joint discussion of appropriate responses to these common problems and challenges, and on the presentation, meaning and identity of our policies. Such a discussion will be possible and fruitful only if it is conducted in a spirit of practicality, equality and modesty (no one can give lessons to anyone else). It will also require political determination.

            The aim should be to step up our presently inadequate relations, gain mutual knowledge and influence, and seize every opportunity for cooperation. In other words, to build an new transatlantic political ‘partnership’ between the Latin American lefts and our political family in Europe.

            Such a partnership would require, first of all, the definition of a number of shared aims and priorities, and the establishment of means of mutual communication. It poses the twofold question of the topics and instruments to be shared.

The SI has a disparate network of affiliates in the region, based on a fairly open membership strategy. The Latin American parties in the SI are not homogeneous in their political references and alliances (they differ, for example, in the positions taken in COPPAL, the São Paolo Forum, etc.) That situation has drawbacks, as well as some advantages. But clarification and the establishment of a few priorities would be a useful target in our discussions. With certain parties and parliamentary groups (not only those of the large countries in the region) it would be helpful to establish closer channels that would make permanent communication possible. There is also a need for a wider dialogue, with organisations that are part of civil society.

As for the topics, they lie in two interrelated fields:

1) formulating concrete policies (especially in the field of bi-regional relations); monitoring national and integration policies on either side of the Atlantic, and debating the approach to be taken in multilateral bodies, especially the WTO (so as to go forward together in the fight against poverty and inequality and for a fairer place for Latin America in the world economic order);

2) dialogue and cooperation on a common set of political issues: relations between parties and social movements, between democratic politics and economic/financial forces, between politics and civil society; joint discussion of other problems that are common to us: the new populist movements, corruption, the future of our political culture, new manifestations of our political identity.

We should also pose the question of the methods and instruments of dialogue between us. The newly established EUROLAT Assembly provides an important basis, but it is not sufficient, any more than sporadic meetings. It seems to me that the new communication tools provided by the Internet are essential in this respect. A ‘virtual bridge’ for open and interactive gatherings would be extremely useful.

            Although left and centre-left forces in Latin America face considerable problems, we are probably witnessing a general process of long duration – a change in the nature of the political contest in a large number of countries in the region. In that contest, progressive forces will not always win, but they will have continuity and the possibility of expansion. They must not lack our support.